Profit allocation analysis among the distributed energy network participants based on Game-theory

被引:49
|
作者
Wu, Qiong [1 ]
Ren, Hongbo [1 ]
Gao, Weijun [2 ]
Ren, Jianxing [1 ]
Lao, Changshi [3 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Elect Power, Coll Energy & Mech Engn, Shanghai 200090, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Kitakyushu, Fac Environm Engn, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka 8080135, Japan
[3] Innova Inst New Energy, Clean Energy Technol Ctr, Shenzhen 518038, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Distributed energy network; MILP; Core; Game-theory; Profit allocation; CHP (COMBINED HEAT; OPTIMAL-DESIGN; SYSTEMS; POWER; MICROGRIDS; OPERATION; UNIT;
D O I
10.1016/j.energy.2016.10.117
中图分类号
O414.1 [热力学];
学科分类号
摘要
To overcome the supply-demand imbalance problem within a conventional distributed energy system, the distributed energy network (DEN) based on electricity and heat interchanges is proposed. With rational design and operation, the DEN may achieve satisfied economic performance compared with the situation without energy interchange. However, the maximum of overall economic benefits does not necessarily lead to satisfied economic performance for each consumer. Therefore, to promote the consumers' participation in the DEN, an effective and fair allocation mechanism for the additional profit is necessary. In this study, firstly, a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model is proposed to deal with the optimal technique selection, lay-out of the energy transmission line and running strategy of the DEN. Then, a mathematical model for fair benefit allocation amongst the participants is presented based on the core method of the cooperative Game-theory. As an illustrative example, three buildings located in Tokyo, Japan have been selected for analysis. According to the simulation results, total annual cost is reduced by 14.5% thanks to the energy interchange within the DEN. Moreover, fair profit allocation mechanism is determined by employing the core method. In this way, a win-win solution is achieved for both group interests and individual interests. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:783 / 794
页数:12
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