Model of profit allocation based on generalized solution in network cooperative game

被引:0
|
作者
Li C. [1 ,2 ]
Xue H.-F. [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an
[2] School of Information, Xi'an University of Finance and Economics, Xi'an
[3] School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an
来源
Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2017年 / 32卷 / 06期
关键词
Generalized core; Generalized reactive bargaining set; Network cooperative game; Profit allocation;
D O I
10.13195/j.kzyjc.2016.0425
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The network cooperative game mainly studies how to distribute the coalition profit to each participant of the network coalition. Considering that many alliances tend to retain part of the profits for redevelopment in the real life, the network game is extended based on the solution definition of the generalized imputation, generalized core and generalized bargaining set, and it is proved that the generalized core of the network cooperative game is equivalent to the generalized reactive bargaining set when the super additive is satisfied. The generalized reactive bargaining set is not empty, and then the nonempty of the generalized core of the network cooperative game is described. Example analysis results show the existence and rationality of the generalized distribution scheme. © 2017, Editorial Office of Control and Decision. All right reserved.
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页码:1041 / 1046
页数:5
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