Demystifying the role of a state ownership in corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the manufacturing sector in Malaysia

The aim of this research is to examine the role of state ownership in corporate governance and firm performance. We employed ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regressions to analyze the effects of state ownership on firm performance. We go beyond existing research on state ownership by carefully disentangle investment objectives of state-controlled financial institutions. Such state ownership can be classified as profit-oriented and non-profit-oriented, in which the former consider return on investment to be the primary investment objective, whereas the latter prioritizes socio-economic development. We found that profit-oriented state ownership is an effective corporate governance mechanism and provides political patronage to the firm in the form of firm's specific resources and credit financing. Although non-profit-oriented state ownership firms also receive similar political patronage, they tend to be associated with inefficiencies such as the free-rider problems, bureaucracies and political intervention in firm management. We conclude that state ownership consists of heterogeneous entities with respect to corporate governance and firm performance.