A Benefits Game Between Private Knowledge Protection and Leaks in Competitive Knowledge Alliances

被引:0
|
作者
Shi Shu-ling [1 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ Commerce, Business Management Dept, Sch Commerce, Tianjin, Peoples R China
关键词
Knowledge Alliances; Private Knowledge Protection; Private Knowledge Leaks; Game;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
From the angle that if knowledge could be shared by partners in competitive knowledge alliances, this paper groups the alliances knowledge into two categories: common knowledge and private knowledge, then points out that the maintenance and success of knowledge alliances not only need a successful common knowledge sharing but also a successful private knowledge protection simultaneously. Based on game theory, the study mainly focuses on private knowledge protection, develops a quantificational benefits game model between private knowledge protection and leaks, indicates some intrinsic and vital variables affecting private knowledge protection or leaks. Furthermore, it takes a systematic analysis to the impact of the variables and the relationship among the variables in order to improve the level of private knowledge protection and decrease the risks of private knowledge leaks.
引用
收藏
页码:271 / 277
页数:7
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