A game-theoretical analysis of poliomyelitis vaccination

被引:20
|
作者
Cheng, Emily [1 ]
Gambhirrao, Neeha [1 ]
Patel, Rohani [1 ]
Zhowandai, Aufia [2 ]
Rychtar, Jan [3 ]
Taylor, Dewey [3 ]
机构
[1] Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Dept Biomed Engn, Richmond, VA 23284 USA
[2] Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Dept Biol, Richmond, VA 23284 USA
[3] Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Dept Math & Appl Math, Richmond, VA 23284 USA
关键词
Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Polio; Vaccination; Age-structured model; IMITATION DYNAMICS; POLIO ERADICATION; SELF-INTEREST; IMMUNIZATION; TRANSMISSION; MODELS; BENEFITS; VACCINES; VIRUSES; MEASLES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110298
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Poliomyelitis is a worldwide disease that has nearly been eradicated thanks to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Nevertheless, the disease is currently still endemic in three countries. In this paper, we incorporate the vaccination in a two age-class model of polio dynamics. Our main objective is to see whether mandatory vaccination policy is needed or if polio could be almost eradicated by a voluntary vaccination. We perform game theoretical analysis and compare the herd immunity vaccination levels with the Nash equilibrium vaccination levels. We show that the gap between two vaccination levels is too large. We conclude that the mandatory vaccination policy is therefore needed to achieve a complete eradication. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页数:10
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