Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist

被引：0
|
作者：
Correia-da-Silva, Joao [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Porto, CEFUP, Rua Dr Roberto Frias, P-4200464 Porto, Portugal
[2] Univ Porto, Fac Econ, Rua Dr Roberto Frias, P-4200464 Porto, Portugal
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2021年 / 129卷
基金：
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词：
Priority pricing; Coase conjecture; Durable goods monopoly; DISCRIMINATION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A durable goods monopolist proposes selling mechanisms in two periods, being unable to commit in the first period on the mechanism to propose in the second. Trade is anonymous and resale is not possible. Although buyers have a continuum of possible valuations, the optimal first-period mechanism is a menu with at most two possibilities: a high price guaranteeing delivery and a low price subject to rationing. This characterization is robust to the arrival of additional buyers in the second period. The optimal mechanism is fully characterized for linear demand, with priority pricing being optimal if agents are sufficiently patient. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：310 / 328
页数：19
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