On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values

被引:0
|
作者
Radzik, Tadeusz [1 ]
机构
[1] Wroclaw Univ Sci & Technol, Fac Pure & Appl Math, Wybrzeze Wyspianskiego 27, PL-50370 Wroclaw, Poland
关键词
Extended TU-game; Extended value; Axiomatization; The Shapley value; The equal division value; The egalitarian Shapley value; The least square prenucleolus; SOLIDARITY; PLAYERS; NULL;
D O I
10.1007/s00186-017-0587-z
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We propose a new more general approach to TU-games and their efficient values, significantly different from the classical one. It leads to extended TU-games described by a triplet , where (N, v) is a classical TU-game on a finite grand coalition N, and is a game worth to be shared between the players in N. Some counterparts of the Shapley value, the equal division value, the egalitarian Shapley value and the least square prenucleolus are defined and axiomatized on the set of all extended TU-games. As simple corollaries of the obtained results, we additionally get some new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the egalitarian Shapley value. Also the problem of independence of axioms is widely discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:149 / 170
页数:22
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