Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities

被引：0
|
作者：
Sokolov, Denis [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] 15 Lake Shore Court 3, Brighton, MA 02135 USA
[2] Boston Coll, Newton, MA 02467 USA
来源：
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2022年 / 119卷
关键词：
Cooperative games; Shapley value; Externalities; Multiple memberships; RULES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.06.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we introduce a new form, the clique function form (CQFF), of TU-games that allows for multiple memberships and explicit externalities. The new notion is based on a graphical representation of the connections between agents in a game. We treat as coalitions only fully connected sub-graphs (i.e., maximal cliques). Following Myerson (1977a) we adapt the well-known efficiency, symmetry, and linearity axioms to the new setting and obtain a unique value for superadditive CQFF games. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：76 / 90
页数：15
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