An evolutionary analysis of buyer insurance and seller reputation in online markets

被引：17
|
作者：
Gueth, Werner
Mengel, Friederike
Ockenfels, Axel
机构：
[1] Max Planck Inst Econ, D-07745 Jena, Germany
[2] Univ Alicante, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ, E-03080 Alicante, Spain
[3] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
来源：
THEORY AND DECISION | 2007年 / 63卷 / 03期
关键词：
Trust; online markets; eBay; reputation mechanism; moral hazard; evolutionary game theory;
D O I：
10.1007/s11238-007-9035-5
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Applying an evolutionary framework, we investigate how a reputation mechanism and a buyer insurance (as used on Internet market platforms such as eBay) interact to promote trustworthiness and trust in markets with moral hazard problems. Our analysis suggests that the costs involved in giving reliable feedback determine the gains from trade that can be obtained in equilibrium. Buyer insurance, on the other hand, can affect the trading dynamics and equilibrium selection. We find that, under reasonable conditions, buyer insurance crowds out trust, and trustworthiness.
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页码：265 / 282
页数：18
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