Research on Executive Compensation Pricing of State-owned Enterprises Based on the Modern Enterprise System

被引：0
|
作者：
Shao, Hui-Min [1 ]
Yu, Yang [1 ]
Xian, Feng-Mao [2 ]
机构：
[1] Yunnan Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Kunming, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[2] Kunming Univ Sci & Technol, Oxbridge Coll, Kunming, Yunnan, Peoples R China
来源：
2019 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND MODEL ENGINEERING (ICEMME 2019) | 2019年
关键词：
The modern enterprise system; the state-owned enterprise; executive compensation pricing; TOP;
D O I：
10.1109/ICEMME49371.2019.00061
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Marketization is the most fundamental principle of state-owned enterprise executive compensation reform, and state-owned enterprises can realize the marketization of executive compensation only if they implement the modern enterprise system. From the perspective of the modern enterprise system, the current problem of executive compensation pricing in state-owned enterprises mainly includes the lack of efficacious measurement methods for pricing and compensation pricing standards, and current policy and regulation restrictions on executive compensation. On this basis, the basic model of executive compensation pricing for state-owned enterprises was designed. At the same time, corresponding measures are proposed to ensure the normal operation of the basic model to improve the scientific nature and rationalization of the regulation to income distribution of state-owned enterprises.
引用
收藏
页码：273 / 277
页数：5
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