Agency theory and executive compensation: The case of Chinese state-owned enterprises

被引：90
|
作者：
Mengistae, T
Xu, LXC
机构：
[1] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[2] Peking Univ, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 22卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1086/383109
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article examines the extent to which agency theory may explain chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises during the 1980s. We find support for the agency theory: CEO pay sensitivity decreases with the variance of performance. Moreover, the performance sensitivity of CEO pay increases with the marginal return to executive action. While the elasticity of pay to sales is slightly smaller than that found for conventional firms in the West generally, our estimate of the semielasticity of pay with respect to profitability is comparable with estimates for regulated industries in the United States.
引用
收藏
页码：615 / 637
页数：23
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