Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

被引：6

作者：

Mas-Colell, Andreu ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE, Barcelona 08005, Catalonia, Spain

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 46卷 / 04期

关键词：

Bimatrix games; Generic finiteness;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.02.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：382 / 383

页数：2

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