Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games

被引:3
|
作者
Renault, Jerome [1 ]
Ziliotto, Bruno [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toulouse 1 Capitole, Toulouse Sch Econ, F-31000 Toulouse, France
[2] Univ Paris 09, Ctr Rech Math Decis, CNRS, PSL Res Inst, F-75016 Paris, France
关键词
stochastic games; limit equilibrium payoffs; folk theorem; PLAYER REPEATED GAMES; FOLK THEOREM;
D O I
10.1287/moor.2019.1015
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of normal-form correlation.
引用
收藏
页码:889 / 895
页数:7
相关论文
共 50 条