Customer concentration and loan contract terms

被引:317
|
作者
Campello, Murillo [1 ,2 ]
Gao, Janet [3 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, 369 Sage Hall,114 East Ave, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[2] NBER, 369 Sage Hall,114 East Ave, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[3] Indiana Univ, 1309 E 10th St, Bloomington, IN 47401 USA
关键词
Customer concentration; Bank loans; Contract terms; Financial distress; Instrumental variables; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; TRADE CREDIT; FIRMS; CASH; ACQUISITIONS; DEBT; REAL; COMPETITION; SUPPLIERS; LINKS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.03.010
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm's customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers' financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer-supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm's relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:108 / 136
页数:29
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