CEO political orientation and loan contract

被引:0
|
作者
Chung, Chune Young [1 ]
Choi, Changhwan [2 ]
Nhan, Do Thi Thanh [3 ]
机构
[1] Chung Ang Univ, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Univ Int Business & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Ton Duc Thang Univ, Fac Finance & Banking, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
关键词
CEO characteristics; Conservative CEO; Trustworthiness; Loan contract; AGENCY COSTS; INFORMATION; CREDIT; OVERCONFIDENCE; DEBT; CONSERVATISM; TRUST; TRUSTWORTHINESS; ACQUISITIONS; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1186/s40854-024-00709-0
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Banks rely on soft information when assessing loan applications, making it crucial to evaluate the trustworthiness of potential borrowers in order to set loan conditions, even in a legal environment where contractual rights are straightforwardly enforced. Given the common belief that certain personality traits-such as trustworthiness, reliability, loyalty, thriftiness, and stinginess-are more often linked to conservatives (Republicans) than to liberals (Democrats), we investigate whether companies with conservative chief executive officers (CEOs) secure more advantageous loan terms compared to others. Our findings indicate that firms with conservative CEOs are able to negotiate bank loans with lower interest spreads and upfront fees. While we do not observe a direct impact of CEO overconfidence on loan pricing, we reveal that the combined influence of CEO conservatism and overconfidence contributes to our primary findings. Additionally, we discovered that conservative CEOs tend to receive more favorable non-price conditions (fewer covenants) and are less inclined to offer collateral.
引用
收藏
页数:36
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Loan money contract
    Russo, Simona
    EIRENE-STUDIA GRAECA ET LATINA, 2016, 52 : 101 - 105
  • [2] The influence of loan officers on loan contract design and performance
    Bushman, Robert
    Gao, Janet
    Martin, Xiumin
    Pacelli, Joseph
    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2021, 71 (2-3):
  • [3] THE "PROTECTED" LOAN AS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
    不详
    YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1937, 46 (08): : 1416 - 1419
  • [4] When political ties matter for firm performance? The role of CEO's political utilization orientation and prosocial orientation
    Bai, Yin
    Xiao, Yingzhao
    Pan, Jingzhou
    Tan, Youchao
    Zeng, Cheng
    ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2024, 41 (03) : 1395 - 1420
  • [5] CEO entrenchment and loan syndication
    Elyasiani, Elyas
    Zhang, Ling
    QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2018, 67 : 334 - 346
  • [6] GENENTECH CEO IN LOAN SCANDAL
    不详
    CHEMISTRY IN BRITAIN, 1995, 31 (11) : 865 - 865
  • [7] DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO MAKE A LOAN
    Tenney, W. Davidson
    VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, 1931, 18 (01) : 76 - 79
  • [8] THE LOAN CONTRACT - MECHANISM OF FINANCIAL CONTROL
    PECCHENINO, RA
    ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1988, 98 (389): : 126 - 137
  • [9] Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms
    Bharath, Sreedhar T.
    Dahiya, Sandeep
    Saunders, Anthony
    Srinivasan, Anand
    REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2011, 24 (04): : 1141 - 1203
  • [10] Securities Loan Agreement as an Unnecessary Contract
    Peracek, Tomas
    EDUCATION EXCELLENCE AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT THROUGH VISION 2020, 2019, : 3273 - 3281