Analysis on the Cooperative Innovation Behavior and Stability of Inter-organizational R&D Project Based on Evolutionary Game

This paper studies the strategies of multi-agent cooperative innovation alliances in inter-organizational R&D projects under the opportunistic behavior of asymmetric enterprises. There are two types of asymmetric enterprises: one is the dominant enterprise with high initial resource endowment, and the other is the member enterprise with low initial resource endowment. Based on evolutionary game theory, it analyzes the multi-agent cooperative innovation behavior of multi-agents and its influencing factors in inter-organizational R&D projects. Construct a game model to observe the cooperative behavior of asymmetric enterprises, and analyze the choice of evolutionary stability strategy combined with the replicator dynamics equation, and verify the theoretical research by simulation. This article proves the positive effects of trust, knowledge complementarity, government rewards, and the negative effects of technology coercive transfer coefficient, technology absorptive capacity, and risk coefficient. The opportunistic behavior of member enterprises will weaken the incentive effect of government rewards and aggravate the negative impact of risk factors. In addition, the fairness of income distribution will also affect the stability of inter-organizational alliances.