The evolution of R&D collaboration in inter-organizational project networks: Effects of reference points for competitive preference

This study examines the evolution of R & D collaboration in inter-organizational project networks by simulating the play of an appropriate game model. We assume that players display reference-dependent competitive preferences, in that each player's utility is the sum of a material payoff and a subjective utility that depends on the difference between her material payoff and those of her neighbors. Some players, called max players, are aggressively competitive, comparing their payoffs to the maximum payoff of their neighbors; the others, called min-players, are prudent, comparing their payoffs to their neighbors' minimum. In each period, a player decides whether to share a high level or a low level of knowledge with her neighbors. We find that the mean collaboration level across the network decreases as a parameter representing the ability to make use of a partner's knowledge increases. When the majority of decision-makers are min-players, a higher competitive preference intensity induces greater average collaboration, but the level of collaboration decreases as preference heterogeneity increases. In contrast, a high intensity of competitive preference prevents the diffusion of collaboration when most decision-makers are max-players, and increased competitive preference heterogeneity leads to greater collaboration. Furthermore, increasing the fraction of max-players leads to a decrease in the total payoff of the entire network. Collaboration in an inter organizational network is more robust when most decision-makers are max-players. Nonetheless, max-players and min-players are equally likely to collaborate when either type is in the majority. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.