Quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information

被引:31
|
作者
Lo, CF [1 ]
Kiang, D
机构
[1] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Inst Theoret Phys, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Phys, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
D O I
10.1016/j.physleta.2005.07.055
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
We investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information, especially how the quantum entanglement affects the first-mover advantage in the classical form. It is found that while positive entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage beyond the classical limit, the advantage is dramatically suppressed by negative entanglement. Moreover, despite that positive quantum entanglement improves the first-mover's tolerance for the informational incompleteness, the quantum effect does not change the basic fact that Firm A's lack of complete information of Finn B's unit cost is eradicating the first-mover advantage. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 70
页数:6
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] New Phenomenons Induced by Quantum Discord and the Initial State Parameter in the Quantum Stackelberg Duopoly Game
    Xu, Lan
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL PHYSICS, 2021, 60 (06) : 2244 - 2253
  • [42] Consumer heterogeneity, incomplete information and pricing in a duopoly with switching costs
    Gabrielsen, TS
    Vagstad, S
    [J]. INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, 2003, 15 (03) : 384 - 401
  • [43] Stochastic perturbations for a duopoly Stackelberg model
    Tian, Baodan
    Zhang, Yong
    Li, Jiamei
    [J]. PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS, 2020, 545
  • [44] Optimal Nonlinear Solutions for Reverse Stackelberg Games with Incomplete Information
    Su, Zhou
    Baldi, Simone
    De Schutter, Bart
    [J]. 2016 IEEE 55TH CONFERENCE ON DECISION AND CONTROL (CDC), 2016, : 5304 - 5309
  • [45] Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with Emission Tax
    Ferreira, Flavio
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS ICNAAM 2019, 2020, 2293
  • [46] Repeated Stackelberg security games: Learning with incomplete state information
    Alcantara-Jimenez, Guillermo
    Clempner, Julio B.
    [J]. RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYSTEM SAFETY, 2020, 195
  • [48] Perfect Subgame Equilibrium in a Stackelberg Duopoly
    Rusescu, Ciprian
    [J]. INNOVATIVE MODELS TO REVIVE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 2020, : 3 - 13
  • [49] Effect of partial-collapse measurement on quantum Stackelberg duopoly game in noninertial frame
    Xiang-Ping Liao
    Chang-Ning Pan
    Man-Sheng Rong
    Mao-Fa Fang
    [J]. Quantum Information Processing, 2019, 18
  • [50] Effect of partial-collapse measurement on quantum Stackelberg duopoly game in noninertial frame
    Liao, Xiang-Ping
    Pan, Chang-Ning
    Rong, Man-Sheng
    Fang, Mao-Fa
    [J]. QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING, 2019, 18 (03)