Quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information

被引:31
|
作者
Lo, CF [1 ]
Kiang, D
机构
[1] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Inst Theoret Phys, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Phys, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
D O I
10.1016/j.physleta.2005.07.055
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
We investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information, especially how the quantum entanglement affects the first-mover advantage in the classical form. It is found that while positive entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage beyond the classical limit, the advantage is dramatically suppressed by negative entanglement. Moreover, despite that positive quantum entanglement improves the first-mover's tolerance for the informational incompleteness, the quantum effect does not change the basic fact that Firm A's lack of complete information of Finn B's unit cost is eradicating the first-mover advantage. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 70
页数:6
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