Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

被引：9
|
作者：
Hatfield, John William [1 ]
Kojima, Fuhito [2 ]
Narita, Yusuke [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Texas Austin, McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
来源：
DISCRETE APPLIED MATHEMATICS | 2014年 / 179卷
基金：
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词：
Many-to-many two-sided matching; Stability; Pareto efficiency; Monotonicity; Strategy-proofness; Max-min preferences; HIGH-SCHOOL MATCH; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; MARRIAGE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.dam.2014.07.003
中图分类号：
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号：
070104 ;
摘要：
We consider the many-to-many two-sided matching problem under a stringent domain restriction on preferences called the max-min criterion. We show that, even under this restriction, there is no stable mechanism that is weakly Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, or monotonic (i.e., respects improvements) for agents on one side of the market. These results imply in particular that three of the main results of Baiou and Balinski (2000) are incorrect. We also show that one of the results of Beau and Balinski (2007) is incorrect as well. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：235 / 240
页数：6
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