Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

被引：38
|
作者：
Konishi, Hideo
Unver, M. Utku
机构：
[1] Boston Coll, Dept Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
[2] Kochi Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2006年 / 129卷 / 01期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
many-to-many matching; pairwise stability; group stability; credible deviation; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems. pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations. unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair. 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any "executable" group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction. we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：57 / 80
页数：24
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