Employment efficiency and sticky wages: Evidence from flows in the labor market

被引:81
|
作者
Hall, RE [1 ]
机构
[1] Hoover Inst War Revolut & Peace, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/0034653054638346
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I consider three views of the labor market. In the first, wages are flexible and employment follows the principle of bilateral efficiency. Workers never lose their jobs because of sticky wages. In the second, wages are sticky and inefficient layoffs do occur. In the third, wages are also sticky, but employment governance is efficient. I show that the behavior of flows in the labor market strongly favors the third view. In the modern U. S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs. Unemployment rises because jobs are hard to find, not because an unusual number of people are thrown into unemployment.
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页码:397 / 407
页数:11
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