Short sellers;
Insider trading;
Government regulation;
SHORT-SALE CONSTRAINTS;
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY;
INTERNAL CONTROL;
PRICE DISCOVERY;
EARNINGS;
RESTRICTIONS;
MANAGEMENT;
DISCLOSURES;
INCENTIVES;
QUALITY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2021.106936
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We examine the impact of short sellers on insider trading profitability using a natural experiment of a pilot program which relaxed short-selling constraints for randomly selected pilot stocks. We find that pilot firms experienced a significant decrease in insider trading profitability during the pilot program. The results are more pronounced for the pilot firms with poor information quality, and for the pilot firms without corporate restrictions on insider trading. Our evidence suggests that short sellers serve an important market disciplinary role by reducing insider trading profitability. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机构:
Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de UnamunoDepartamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Unamuno
Brio E.B.
Perote J.
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h-index: 0
机构:
Departamento de Economia Aplicada II y Fundamentos del Analisis Economico, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, MadridDepartamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Unamuno