Insider trading;
Director discretion;
DELAYED-DISCLOSURE;
INFORMATION;
TRADES;
PERFORMANCE;
D O I:
10.1016/j.pacfin.2016.05.005
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Using a machine-learning algorithm, we classify over 60,000 director transactions into discretionary and non-discretionary purchases and sales based on the trading motive provided by the insider. We find that discretionary trades by company insiders are more informed than non -discretionary trades. Further, discretionary purchases generate higher abnormal returns (1) for larger purchases, or when the purchase is for (2) the stock of a smaller firm, or (3) a firm with greater information asymmetry. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de UnamunoDepartamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Unamuno
Brio E.B.
Perote J.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Departamento de Economia Aplicada II y Fundamentos del Analisis Economico, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, MadridDepartamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Unamuno