RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT;
MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY;
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM;
FUTURE EARNINGS;
EQUITY PRICES;
STOCK RETURNS;
OWNERSHIP;
TRADES;
D O I:
10.1080/09638180.2015.1040045
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and the profitability of insider trading. A priori the relationship is not clear. On the one hand, institutions possess superior information that erodes insider advantages and are also active in monitoring. On the other hand, institutions could treat insider trading as an incentivizing mechanism to induce manager effort, leading to improved aggregate shareholder welfare. The results indicate that, on average, institutional ownership is negatively related to the profitability of insider trading, and this relationship derives from both direct monitoring and trading/pricing. Further analysis indicates that this relationship is concentrated for insider sales. In contrast, the findings reveal a positive relationship between institutions and the profitability of insider purchases, indicating an incentivizing role.
机构:
China Foreign Affairs Univ, Sch Int Econ, 24,Zhanlan Rd, Beijing 100037, Peoples R ChinaChina Foreign Affairs Univ, Sch Int Econ, 24,Zhanlan Rd, Beijing 100037, Peoples R China
Li, Tao
Ji, Yu
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机构:
Beihang Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 37 Xueyuan Rd, Beijing 100191, Peoples R ChinaChina Foreign Affairs Univ, Sch Int Econ, 24,Zhanlan Rd, Beijing 100037, Peoples R China
机构:
Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de UnamunoDepartamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Unamuno
Brio E.B.
Perote J.
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h-index: 0
机构:
Departamento de Economia Aplicada II y Fundamentos del Analisis Economico, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, MadridDepartamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Unamuno