High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: Stock-based versus stock option-based compensation

被引：9
|
作者：
Andergassen, Rainer [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2008年 / 101卷 / 02期
关键词：
Executive compensation; Executive stock options; Restricted stock; Fraud; Incentives;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper examines the trade-off shareholders face between providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial effort and to engage in costly fraudulent activity. We provide a solution to the optimal compensation problem, given that shareholders can either grant (restricted) stock or stock options and given fixed average compensation costs. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：122 / 125
页数：4
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