The influence of management team continuation on inefficient investment after family firms inheritance

被引：3
|
作者：
Wu, Jiong [1 ]
Wang, Feifei [1 ]
Xu, Xing [2 ]
机构：
[1] Donghua Univ, Glorious Sun Sch Business Management, 1882 Yanan West Rd, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China
来源：
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2021年 / 42卷 / 01期
关键词：
CEO TURNOVER; PERFORMANCE; SUCCESSION; INVOLVEMENT; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; DIVERSITY; CONFLICT; ALTRUISM; ORIGIN; WEALTH;
D O I：
10.1002/mde.3220
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The purpose of this study is to explore how the executive team continuation affects the successor's investment decisions. To this end, we use data of Chinese A-share listed heritage family enterprises. The findings reveal that executive team continuation has a negative impact on inefficient investment. At the same time, the successor's control rights have a moderating effect on the relationship between the executive team continuation and the successor's investment decisions. In addition, further research shows that the heterogeneity of senior executives' tenure, the number of independent directors, and the distribution of senior executives' professional backgrounds are conducive to explaining the internal mechanism of the continuation of the management team.
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页码：156 / 169
页数：14
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