Incentive Mechanism Design of the Cost Compensation in Electricity Universal Service

被引:0
|
作者
Li, Hong Ze [1 ]
Cheng, Yan Cong [1 ]
Li, Chun Jie [1 ]
机构
[1] N China Elect Power Univ, Beijing 102206, Peoples R China
关键词
Electricity market; Universal service; Cost compensation; Incentive mechanism; system engineering;
D O I
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.524-527.3118
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
Universal service is one of public functions of government and fundamental work in the system engineering for a harmonious society. Owing to the beneficiaries live in remote place, so the marginal cost of universal service is high, meal while The objection of power enterprises is inconsistent with a government's public functions. In order to encourage power enterprise to undertake universal service, government should provide the cost compensation that is based on the associated costs of universal service. For disclosing the real cost, this paper studied the conditions of individual rationality and incentive compatibility of the power enterprise undertaking universal service. Finally, it contributed a theoretical basis for the cost compensation.
引用
收藏
页码:3118 / 3121
页数:4
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