Effectiveness of Administration and Supervision on Overseas State-owned Assets of China

State-owned multinational corporations are a specific phenomenon in China. This paper analyzes the efficiency loss problem of administration and supervision on overseas state-owned assets of China, on the basis of principal-agency theory. The management system of state-owned assets such as "state ownership, hierarchical management, authorized operations and supervision with a due division of labor" has some defects in the unclear agency relationship, which cause some agency problems such as owner vacancy, owner offside and internal person control. Uncertainty of multinational operations strengthens the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent more obviously, which leads to serious losses of overseas state-owned assets. It brings forward a suggestion on a strategy-oriented investor management system, carrying out classified supervision and management on multinational corporations. A function-oriented assessment with a performance assessment method of a balanced scorecard is also introduced, so as to promote the value maintenance and appreciation of state-owned assets.