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Long-run selection and the work ethic
被引:1
|作者:
Josephson, Jens
[2
]
Waerneryd, Karl
[1
]
机构:
[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Business, Barcelona 08005, Spain
关键词:
work ethic;
evolution;
public goods;
stochastic dynamics;
D O I:
10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.007
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Applying stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:354 / 365
页数:12
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