Nonsmooth Continuous-Time Distributed Algorithms for Seeking Generalized Nash Equilibria of Noncooperative Games via Digraphs

被引:18
|
作者
Lu, Kaihong [1 ]
Zhu, Qixin [2 ]
机构
[1] Jiangsu Univ, Sch Elect & Informat Engn, Zhenjiang 212013, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Suzhou Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Mech Engn, Suzhou 215009, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Games; Cost function; Distributed algorithms; Mathematical model; Consensus algorithm; Topology; Nash equilibrium; Distributed algorithm; multiagent networks; Nash equilibrium (NE); noncooperative game; MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS; AGGREGATIVE GAMES; CONSENSUS; AGENTS; CONTROLLABILITY; OPTIMIZATION; NETWORKS; TOPOLOGY; TRACKING; LEADER;
D O I
10.1109/TCYB.2021.3049463
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In this article, the problem of distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking in noncooperative games is investigated via multiagent networks, where each player aims to minimize his or her own cost function with a nonsmooth term. Each player's cost function and feasible action set in the noncooperative game are both determined by actions of others who may not be neighbors, as well as his/her own action. Particularly, feasible action sets are constrained by private convex inequalities and shared linear equations. Each player can only have access to his or her own cost function, private constraint, and a local block of shared constraints, and can only communicate with his or her neighbours via a digraph. To address this problem, a novel continuous-time distributed primal-dual algorithm involving Clarke's generalized gradient is proposed based on consensus algorithms and the primal-dual algorithm. Under mild assumptions on cost functions and graph, we prove that players' actions asymptotically converge to a GNE. Finally, a simulation is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of our theoretical results.
引用
收藏
页码:6196 / 6206
页数:11
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