Understanding Deep Disagreement

被引:0
|
作者
Pritchard, Duncan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Philosophy, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
关键词
Deep disagreement; epistemology; epistemology of disagreement; hinge epistemology; Wittgenstein; WITTGENSTEIN;
D O I
10.1080/09672559.2023.2263709
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements - i.e. disagreements concerning clashes of one's hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.
引用
收藏
页码:301 / 317
页数:17
相关论文
共 50 条