How to mobilize owner-dynamic capabilities in megaprojects? A tripartite evolutionary game approach

被引:0
|
作者
Tian, Zidan [1 ]
He, Qinghua [2 ]
Wang, Ting [3 ]
机构
[1] Tongji Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Tongji Univ, Res Inst Complex Engn & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Hanghai Inst Technol, Shanghai, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Owner-dynamic capability; Megaproject; Tripartite evolutionary game; Reciprocity preference; Participant network; RECIPROCITY; MANAGEMENT; PROJECTS; GOVERNANCE; TRUST;
D O I
10.1108/ECAM-04-2023-0323
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
PurposeCurrently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability development within the owner organization, whereas they rarely analyze the capability mobilization within the network of participants in megaprojects. Therefore, this study aims to explain the interaction and evolution of the mobilization strategies of ODCs and the cooperative strategies of other participants.Design/methodology/approachThis study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of the owner, the reciprocal participants and the general participants. Results are numerically simulated with a validation case. The asymptotic stability of multiple group strategies is discussed under the replicator dynamic system.FindingsThis study suggests that resource complementarity significantly reduces the difficulty of mobilization. Moreover, these strategies are only effective with sufficient ODCs. The results indicate that reciprocal participants are more sensitive to the change in resource complementarity.Originality/valueThis study provides strategic guidance for mobilizing ODCs in megaprojects to better embrace uncertainty and stress, contributing to the dynamic capability literature with an evolutionary game approach. And new insight for the study of reciprocity preference in megaprojects is also provided.
引用
收藏
页码:1478 / 1498
页数:21
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