How to mobilize owner-dynamic capabilities in megaprojects? A tripartite evolutionary game approach

被引:0
|
作者
Tian, Zidan [1 ]
He, Qinghua [2 ]
Wang, Ting [3 ]
机构
[1] Tongji Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Tongji Univ, Res Inst Complex Engn & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Hanghai Inst Technol, Shanghai, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Owner-dynamic capability; Megaproject; Tripartite evolutionary game; Reciprocity preference; Participant network; RECIPROCITY; MANAGEMENT; PROJECTS; GOVERNANCE; TRUST;
D O I
10.1108/ECAM-04-2023-0323
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
PurposeCurrently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability development within the owner organization, whereas they rarely analyze the capability mobilization within the network of participants in megaprojects. Therefore, this study aims to explain the interaction and evolution of the mobilization strategies of ODCs and the cooperative strategies of other participants.Design/methodology/approachThis study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of the owner, the reciprocal participants and the general participants. Results are numerically simulated with a validation case. The asymptotic stability of multiple group strategies is discussed under the replicator dynamic system.FindingsThis study suggests that resource complementarity significantly reduces the difficulty of mobilization. Moreover, these strategies are only effective with sufficient ODCs. The results indicate that reciprocal participants are more sensitive to the change in resource complementarity.Originality/valueThis study provides strategic guidance for mobilizing ODCs in megaprojects to better embrace uncertainty and stress, contributing to the dynamic capability literature with an evolutionary game approach. And new insight for the study of reciprocity preference in megaprojects is also provided.
引用
收藏
页码:1478 / 1498
页数:21
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Exploring the affective underpinnings of dynamic managerial capabilities: How managers' emotion regulation behaviors mobilize resources for their firms
    Huy, Quy
    Zott, Christoph
    STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2019, 40 (01) : 28 - 54
  • [22] HOW BRANDING CAPABILITIES HELP MANUFACTURING COMPANIES IN INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT? -DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES APPROACH
    Mitrega, Maciej
    BUSINESS MANAGEMENT THEORIES AND PRACTICES IN A DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT, 2019, : 1753 - 1755
  • [23] How can rural China achieve sustainable development through inclusive innovation? A tripartite evolutionary game analysis
    Zhang, Chen
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2024, 469
  • [24] How to promote the sustainable development of virtual reality technology for training in construction filed: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis
    Shi, Chunyan
    Miao, Xinyue
    Liu, Hui
    Han, Yang
    Wang, Yafei
    Gao, Weijun
    Liu, Gen
    Li, Siwen
    Lin, Yingzi
    Wei, Xindong
    Xu, Tongyu
    PLOS ONE, 2023, 18 (09):
  • [25] How to promote municipal household waste management by waste classification and recycling? A stochastic tripartite evolutionary game analysis
    Zhu, Chaoping
    Fan, Ruguo
    Lin, JinChai
    Chen, Rongkai
    Luo, Ming
    JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 2023, 344
  • [26] How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model
    Liu, Jida
    Song, Yuwei
    An, Shi
    Dong, Changqi
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2022, 19 (03)
  • [27] How to break carbon lock-in of thermal power industry in China-A tripartite evolutionary game analysis
    Wen, Ruan
    Heng, Zhang
    Jin, Yang
    APPLIED ENERGY, 2025, 377
  • [28] Multi-scenario analyses for antitrust immunity policies on shipping alliances: A dynamic tripartite evolutionary game perspective
    Zhao, Chuan
    Guo, Qidong
    Dong, Kangyin
    Mo, Lipo
    TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART A-POLICY AND PRACTICE, 2024, 179
  • [29] A tripartite evolutionary game study of low-carbon innovation system from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes
    Liu, Dongsheng
    Feng, Meili
    Liu, Yanni
    Wang, Liming
    Hu, Jinhao
    Wang, Gaojie
    Zhang, Jianlin
    JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 2024, 356
  • [30] Metaheuristic optimization with dynamic strategy adaptation: An evolutionary game theory approach
    Cuevas, Erik
    Luque, Alberto
    Aguirre, Nahum
    Navarro, Mario A.
    Rodriguez, Alma
    PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS, 2024, 645