A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models

被引:1
|
作者
Enache, Andreea [1 ]
Florens, Jean-Pierre [2 ]
Sbai, Erwann [3 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
[3] Univ Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
关键词
First-price auction model; Quantile methods; Regularization methods; Mildly ill-posed inverse problem; NONPARAMETRIC-ESTIMATION; IDENTIFICATION; INFERENCE; ASYMMETRY; BIDDERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.12.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper introduces new methods of identification and estimation of the first-price sealed bid auction model and compares them with the previous existing ones.The first method of estimation allows us to estimate directly (through an iterative algorithm) the cumulative distribution function of the private values without estimating the private values beforehand. In the second method, we use a quantile approach. Although the first-price auction is a complex nonlinear inverse problem, the use of quantile leads to a linearization of the model. Thus, in contrast with the existing methods we are able to deduce a closed-form solution for the quantile of the private values. This constructive identification allows for a one-stage estimation procedure that can be performed using three regularization methods: the Tikhonov regularization, the Landweber-Friedman regularization and the kernels.We conduct a Monte Carlo experiment to compare our methods of estimation by c.d.f. and quantiles with the methods of estimation developed by Guerre et al. (2000), Marmer and Shneyerov (2012), and Hickman and Hubbard (2015). Some extensions of the model are considered: asymmetric bidders, affiliation, conditional models to exogenuous variables, and the observation of only the winning bids.& COPY; 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
引用
收藏
页码:1564 / 1588
页数:25
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Unconditionally Secure First-Price Auction Protocols Using a Multicomponent Commitment Scheme
    Nojoumian, Mehrdad
    Stinson, Douglas R.
    INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, 2010, 6476 : 266 - 280
  • [42] Bidding Game Model of Innovation Suppliers Based on First-Price Sealed Auction
    Chang, Yue
    Ju, Xiaofeng
    Liu, Maozhang
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2012 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (ICMIPP 2012), VOLS 1-6, 2012, : 3210 - 3213
  • [43] Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Risk Aversion Case in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
    An, Xin
    Liu, Shulin
    Xu, Shuo
    COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 38 (04) : 439 - 463
  • [44] Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Risk Aversion Case in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
    Xin An
    Shulin Liu
    Shuo Xu
    Computational Economics, 2011, 38 : 439 - 463
  • [45] Identification and estimation of Bidders' risk aversion in first-price auctions
    Perrigne, Isabelle
    Vuong, Quang
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (02): : 444 - 448
  • [46] Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes
    Mark V. Van Boening
    Stephen J. Rassenti
    Vernon L. Smith
    Experimental Economics, 1998, 1 (2) : 147 - 159
  • [47] Price Manipulability in First-Price Auctions
    Brustle, Johannes
    Dutting, Paul
    Sivan, Balasubramanian
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM WEB CONFERENCE 2022 (WWW'22), 2022, : 58 - 67
  • [48] On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
    Prokopovych, Pavlo
    Yannelis, Nicholas C.
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2019, 184
  • [49] NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF ENTRY COST IN FIRST-PRICE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
    Xu, Pai
    JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, 2013, 28 (06) : 1046 - 1065
  • [50] Using all bids in parametric estimation of first-price auctions
    Li, T
    Vuong, Q
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1997, 55 (03) : 321 - 325