Bidding Game Model of Innovation Suppliers Based on First-Price Sealed Auction

被引:0
|
作者
Chang, Yue [1 ]
Ju, Xiaofeng [1 ]
Liu, Maozhang [2 ]
机构
[1] Harbin Inst Technol, Harbin 150001, Heilongjiang, Peoples R China
[2] Harbin Engn Univ, Harbin 150001, Heilongjiang, Peoples R China
关键词
first-price sealed auction; technological innovation diffusion; innovation suppliers; bidding game model;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In technological innovation diffusion process, the innovation suppliers, intermediary institutions, governments and latent adopters are all participants in the game. If innovation suppliers are far more than potential adopters, there will be bidding game among the innovation suppliers. Because of confidential information, there will be incomplete information competition game between innovation suppliers. Based on the similarity between the first-price sealed auction and the innovation suppliers' bidding in technological innovation diffusion process, this paper studies the innovation suppliers' bidding bidding by using the first-price sealed auction model. The innovation suppliers' bidding game model is established, and the optimal bidding strategies of the innovation suppliers are gained. It resolves quantitatively the problem of the bidding in the incomplete information, and provides reference for decision- making bid to the innovation suppliers.
引用
收藏
页码:3210 / 3213
页数:4
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