The paper touches upon the problem of differentiating between virtual reality and original reality. The article makes a contribution to the modern ontology, as it discusses the problem of the status of virtual reality, which is formed by modern technical and mathematical means using cognitive technologies. The work is based on the concepts of E. Husserl and H. Putnam, as well as theories of psychophysiology and cognitive sciences. Arguments are provided for the following opposing statements: that it is possible to differentiate between them and that it is not. To specify the distinctive features of virtual reality, the latter is described as a system of perceived existing things and in comparison to other forms of such systems: subjective and objective, individual and social, natural and cultural, material and ideal, original and fictional, abstract and transcendental, evident and illusionary, true and false, erroneous and imitative, deceitful and mistaken, performative and simulating, conditional and unconditional ones. This part of the article qualifies virtual reality as illusion created via imitation. It is further revealed that the key distinctive feature of original reality, which is defined in the modern phenomenology as the maximal level of evidence, is applicable to virtual reality as well. The major argument in favor of the provable difference between virtual and original reality, which the contemporary analytic philosophy offers, can be confuted by means of a thought experi-ment based on the doubling of virtual reality. The final part of the article discusses psychologi-cal (experiment-based cognitive) arguments in favor of differentiating between virtual and original reality successfully: effect of presence and immersion. Both effects are typical of the reality types under comparison, as well as of experiencing these realities. The paper concludes that neither philosophy nor cognitive sciences can offer a compelling argument to differentiate between original reality and virtual reality.
