Husserl's three-part model for intentionality: an examination of players, play acts, and playgrounds

In this analysis, I employ Husserl's three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits' logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga's overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits' work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work - namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play - namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories.