Fair Ride Allocation on a Line

The airport problem is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This article extends it to a more general setting involving multiple facilities. Specifically, in our model, each agent selects a facility and shares the cost with the other agents using the same facility. This scenario frequently occurs in sharing economies, such as sharing subscription costs for a multi-user license or taxi fares among customers traveling to potentially different destinations along a route. Our model can be viewed as a coalition formation game with size constraints, based on the fair cost-sharing of the airport problem. We refer to our model as a fair ride allocation on a line. We incorporate Nash stability and envy-freeness as criteria for solution concepts in our setting. We show that if a feasible allocation exists, a Nash stable feasible allocation that minimizes the social cost of agents exists and can be computed efficiently. Regarding envy-freeness, we provide several structural properties of envy-free allocations. Based on these properties, we design efficient algorithms for finding an envy-free allocation when either (1) the number of facilities, (2) the number of agent types, or (3) the capacity of facilities, is small. Moreover, we show that a consecutive envy-free allocation can be computed in polynomial time. On the negative front, we show NP-completeness of determining the existence of an allocation under two relaxed envy-free concepts.