TU-games with utilities: the prenucleolus and its characterization set

被引:1
|
作者
Dornai, Zsofia [1 ]
Pinter, Miklos [2 ]
机构
[1] Budapest Univ Technol & Econ, Inst Math, Dept Anal & Operat Res, Muegyet Rkp 3, H-1111 Budapest, Hungary
[2] Corvinus Univ Budapest, Corvinus Inst Adv Stud, Corvinus Ctr Operat Res, Budapest, Hungary
关键词
TU-games; Restricted cooperation; Prenucleolus; Core; Essential coalitions; TU-games with utility; MODIFIED NUCLEOLUS;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-024-00905-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
TU-games with utility functions are considered. Generalizations of the prenucleolus, essential coalitions and the core: the u\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\textbf{u}}$$\end{document}-prenucleolus, u\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\textbf{u}}$$\end{document}-essential coalitions and the u\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\textbf{u}}$$\end{document}-core respectively are introduced. We show that u\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\textbf{u}}$$\end{document}-essential coalitions form a characterisation set for the u\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\textbf{u}}$$\end{document}-prenucleolus in case of games with nonempty u\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\textbf{u}}$$\end{document}-core.
引用
收藏
页码:1005 / 1032
页数:28
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