All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers

被引：0

作者：

Selcuk, Cemil ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff Business Sch, Dept Econ, Cardiff, Wales

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2024年 / 242卷

关键词：

All-pay auctions; Directed search; Budget constraints; Competing auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111886

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a competitive market with budget-constrained buyers, an equilibrium where sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is available. If budgets are not too limited, then all-pay auctions emerge as the preferred selling format.

引用

页数：4

共 5 条

[1] Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers
Selcuk, Cemil
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2017, 103 : 262 - 285
[2] Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests
Epstein, Gil S.
Mealem, Yosef
Nitzan, Shmuel
[J]. ECONOMICS & POLITICS, 2013, 25 (01) : 48 - 60
[3] On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
Kotowski, Maciej H.
Li, Fei
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2014, 85 : 84 - 108
[4] Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
Che, YK
Gale, I
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1996, 50 (03) : 373 - 379
[5] Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction: A theoretical and experimental investigation
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Mill, Wladislaw
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2021, 130 : 616 - 635

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