Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction: A theoretical and experimental investigation

被引：2

作者：

Kirchkamp, Oliver ^{[1
]}

Mill, Wladislaw ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Jena, Sch Econ, Carl Zeiss Str 3, D-07743 Jena, Germany

[2] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, L7 3-5, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2021年 / 130卷

关键词：

Auction; Overbidding; Spite; Risk; Experiment; DUTCH AUCTIONS; LOSS AVERSION; RENT-SEEKING; WAR; 1ST-PRICE; EQUILIBRIUM; ATTRITION; BEHAVIOR; INFORMATION; PRICES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We use an experiment to compare a theory of risk-aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay auction. Both risk and spite are used to rationalize deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids. We exploit that equilibrium predictions in the second-price all-pay auctions for spite are different than those for risk-aversion. We find that spite is a convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not only can spite rationalize observed bids, also our measure for spite is consistent with observed bids. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：616 / 635

页数：20