Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

被引：57
|
作者：
Che, YK
Gale, I
机构：
[1] GEORGETOWN UNIV,DEPT ECON,WASHINGTON,DC 20057
[2] US DEPT JUSTICE,WASHINGTON,DC 20530
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1996年 / 50卷 / 03期
关键词：
budget constraints; first-price sealed-bid auctions; all-pay auctions;
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(95)00766-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.
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页码：373 / 379
页数：7
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