PUBLICLY PROVIDED DISASTER INSURANCE FOR HEALTH AND THE CONTROL OF MORAL HAZARD

被引：19

|

作者：

BESLEY, T

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1989年 / 39卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0047-2727(89)90037-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：141 / 156

页数：16

相关论文

共 50 条

[41] Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States
Hudson, Paul
Botzen, W. J. Wouter
Czajkowski, Jeffrey
Kreibich, Heidi
LAND ECONOMICS, 2017, 93 (02) : 179 - 208
[42] On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard
Karni, Edi
GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW, 2008, 33 (01): : 1 - 18
[43] Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion
Alger, I
Ma, CTA
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2003, 50 (02) : 225 - 247
[44] PENSION INSURANCE, BANKRUPTCY AND MORAL HAZARD
KEATING, D
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW, 1991, (01) : 65 - 108
[45] On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard
Edi Karni
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2008, 33 : 1 - 18
[46] MORAL HAZARD AND DYNAMIC INSURANCE DATA
Abbring, Jaap H.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre
Pinquet, Jean
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2003, 1 (04)
[47] Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance
Wu, Shenan
Goodwin, Barry K.
Coble, Keith
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2020, 51 (01) : 131 - 142
[48] REPEATED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD
RUBINSTEIN, A
YAARI, ME
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 30 (01) : 74 - 97
[49] Health benefits at work: Part 2 - What is health insurance? (... and what is "moral hazard"?)
Forman, HP
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ROENTGENOLOGY, 2005, 184 (03) : A15 - A16
[50] On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard
Pierre Martinon
Pierre Picard
Anasuya Raj
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2018, 43 : 137 - 185

← 1 2 3 4 5 →