PUBLICLY PROVIDED DISASTER INSURANCE FOR HEALTH AND THE CONTROL OF MORAL HAZARD

被引：19
|
作者：
BESLEY, T
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1989年 / 39卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0047-2727(89)90037-6
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：141 / 156
页数：16
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