COMPUTABLE STRATEGIES FOR REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引：16
|
作者：
KNOBLAUCH, V
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1994年 / 7卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/game.1994.1057
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
For undiscounted, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, examples are given of a computable strategy to which there is no best response, and a computable strategy to which there are best responses but no computable best responses. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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页码：381 / 389
页数：9
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