HOW TO RESIST INVASION IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME

被引：6

|

作者：

SWISTAK, P

机构：

来源：

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE | 1989年 / 34卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1002/bs.3830340205

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

引用

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页码：151 / 153

页数：3

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