EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引：58

|

作者：

FARRELL, J ^{[1
]}

WARE, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV TORONTO, DEPT ECON, TORONTO M5S 1A1, ONTARIO, CANADA

来源：

THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY | 1989年 / 36卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0

中图分类号：

Q14 [生态学（生物生态学）];

学科分类号：

071012 ; 0713 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：161 / 166

页数：6

相关论文

共 50 条

[1] MISTAKES ALLOW EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME
BOYD, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 1989, 136 (01) : 47 - 56
[2] STOCHASTIC EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
LINSTER, BG
[J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1994, 32 (02) : 342 - 357
[3] EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE INFINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA PLAYED BY 2-STATE MOORE MACHINES
LINSTER, BG
[J]. SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1992, 58 (04) : 880 - 903
[4] EVOLUTION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
NACHBAR, JH
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1992, 19 (03) : 307 - 326
[5] COOPERATION IN A REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA WITH OSTRACISM
HIRSHLEIFER, D
RASMUSEN, E
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1989, 12 (01) : 87 - 106
[6] PERCEPTRONS PLAY THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
CHO, IK
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1995, 67 (01) : 266 - 284
[7] COMPUTABLE STRATEGIES FOR REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
KNOBLAUCH, V
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1994, 7 (03) : 381 - 389
[8] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
KREPS, DM
MILGROM, P
ROBERTS, J
WILSON, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252
[9] INVASION DYNAMICS OF THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
NOWAK, MA
SIGMUND, K
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1995, 11 (02) : 364 - 390
[10] EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR AND REPEATED PLAY OF PRISONERS-DILEMMA
ROTH, AE
MURNIGHAN, JK
[J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1978, 17 (02) : 189 - 198

← 1 2 3 4 5 →