MORAL HAZARD, LIMITED-LIABILITY AND TAXATION - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

被引：4
|
作者：
BANERJEE, A [1 ]
BESLEY, T [1 ]
机构：
[1] PRINCETON UNIV,WOODROW WILSON SCH,DEPT ECON,PRINCETON,NJ 08544
来源：
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 1990年 / 42卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041943
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：46 / 60
页数：15
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
    Biais, Bruno
    Mariotti, Thomas
    Rochet, Jean-Charles
    Villeneuve, Stephane
    [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 2010, 78 (01) : 73 - 118
  • [42] Principal-agent model based on the principal and agent's asymmetric overconfidence
    Business School, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
    [J]. Xitong Gongcheng Lilum yu Shijian, 2009, 4 (92-102):
  • [43] Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard on Network Platform of Science and Technology Papers Published Based on Principal-agent Theory
    Liu, Guo-liang
    Wang, Dong
    Qu, Jiu-long
    Zhang, Li-hua
    [J]. 2009 1ST IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON WEB SOCIETY, PROCEEDINGS, 2009, : 36 - 40
  • [44] SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY REGIMES, PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS, AND BANKING INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
    EVANS, LT
    QUIGLEY, NC
    [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1995, 38 (02): : 497 - 520
  • [45] Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model
    Menard, Sebastien
    [J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2021, 57 (01) : 5 - 33
  • [46] A graphical approach to the standard principal-agent model
    Zhou, XM
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION, 2002, 33 (03): : 265 - 276
  • [47] Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
    Pitchford, R
    [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1998, 61 (02) : 251 - 259
  • [48] Environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability
    Strand, J.
    [J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 1994, 4 (05) : 495 - 509
  • [49] COMPENSATION AND TRANSFER PRICING IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
    BESANKO, D
    SIBLEY, DS
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1991, 32 (01) : 55 - 68
  • [50] Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
    Balmaceda, Felipe
    Balseiro, Santiago R.
    Correa, Jose R.
    Stier-Moses, Nicolas E.
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2016, 95 : 137 - 155
12345