COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH BARGAINING

被引：1
|
作者：
SEN, A
机构：
[1] Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Bombay
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 36卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90177-M
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The generalized Nash bargaining solutions is used to model output decisions of rival firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Expressions for price-cost margins and the objective function that a Cournot equilibrium implicitly maximizes, are obtained. As compared with the situation where firms maximize profits, these are shown to involve additional cost terms. © 1991.
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页码：133 / 136
页数：4
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